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1. Introduction 
Most central banks now employ inflation targetting and adjust short-term interest rate to 
ensure that inflation remains within their target range. This approach, common since the 
1980s, has been accompanied by tight, passive fiscal policy in the pursuit of budget 
surpluses. This counter-inflation policy has been associated with persistently high 
unemployment in most OECD economies and some economists would say that it has 
caused the chronic lack of jobs (Modigliani, 2000; Mitchell, 2001a, Mitchell and 
Muysken, 2002a). Australia, for instance, did not approach full employment despite the 
1990s growth period and trend unemployment is positive. The low point unemployment 
rate ratcheted upwards over successive cycles since 1976.2 The problem is worse when 
broader measures of labour underutilisation are considered (Mitchell and Carlson, 2001). 
Underpinning the shift from fiscal activism is a belief, held by many economists, that a 
unique (natural) level of economic activity exists (the so-called NAIRU) which is 
consistent with low inflation.3 Policy makers constrain their economies to achieve this 
(assumed) cyclically invariant benchmark. The NAIRU is not observed and a range of 
techniques are used to estimate it (Mitchell, 2001a). Yet, despite its centrality to policy, 
the NAIRU evades accurate estimation and the case for uniqueness and cyclical 
invariance is weak (Chang, 1997; Staiger, Stock and Watson, 1997; Fair, 2000; Mitchell, 
2001a). Given these vagaries, its use as a policy tool is highly contentious. 
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) (2002) admits there are short-term costs of 
inflation targetting (lost output and rising unemployment) but argues that medium- to 
long-run real output growth is higher as a result.4 They say the benefits of low inflation 
justify the temporary losses. The view that these costs are ephemeral and trivial is one of 
the most contentious issues in macroeconomics. The history of OECD economies since 
inflation targetting became the norm does not support the view that a low inflation 
environment generates sustained low unemployment (Mitchell, 2001a). Unemployment 
also behaves asymmetrically (see Rothman, 1998; Skalin and Teräsvirta, 2002; Mitchell, 
2002) rising sharply in downturns and declining slowly as growth resumes. Disinflation 
thus imposes greater costs than has been previously estimated using linear models, which 
themselves are prone to inaccuracies, like imprecise NAIRU estimation (Mitchell, 2002). 
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There is clearly a need to model the costs of inflation targetting using robust models that 
allow for asymmetry and which can also distinguish between short- and long-run cost 
horizons. In this paper, as a start, we aim to develop a model which will help us explain 
some outstanding stylised facts that describe the behaviour of the Australian labour 
market. We argue that the orthodox NAIRU paradigm cannot explain these stylised facts 
and hence monetary policy that is based on the NAIRU concept is flawed. In addressing 
the stylised facts we aim to integrate an explanation of the labour market dynamics with a 
segmented labour market theory of wage determination. The stylised facts we address 
are: (a) the Australian economy has been demand constrained since 1975 and fails to 
generate sufficient employment; (b) Unemployment is highly persistent and asymmetric; 
(c) the cyclical behaviour of short- and long-term unemployment is similar and the latter 
does threaten a low inflation expansion; (d) active labour market programs are largely 
ineffective; (e) gross flows are  reveal large inertia in all labour force categories; and (f) 
outflow rates are remarkably stable over time but show the expected cyclical behaviour. 
First, we outline a model from Ball (1999) and enhanced by Mitchell and Muysken 
(2002a), which sources unemployment asymmetry in the behaviour of labour market 
flows. We conclude that in a period of persistent demand deficiency the stock-flow 
relations required to generate the asymmetry fail because of the persistence in short-term 
unemployment. Second, we develop asymmetries in terms of product market behaviour 
and focus on irreversibilities in investment which lead business firms to be reluctant to 
embark on new projects after a recession until they are certain that demand conditions 
(and capacity utilisation) are back to ‘normal’ (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The labour 
market asymmetries then occur in response to the way in which employment, 
unemployment and labour productivity react to the spending asymmetries. We introduce 
a segmented labour market model to reconcile two claims: (a) short-term and long-term 
unemployment display similar cyclical behaviour; and (b) the latter does not condition 
the inflation process. In the secondary labour market, employment opportunities consist 
mostly of part-time jobs and employers are relatively indifferent to the characteristics of 
the labour force. As a consequence, the long-term unemployed can gain access to these 
positions. Since the primary and secondary markets are complementary in their reaction 
to changes in output, similarities in variation over time in short- and long-term 
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unemployment are explained. But the primary labour market is the wage leader and so 
short-term unemployment determines wage setting behaviour. 
Section 2 outlines some stylised facts about the Australian economy, while Section 3 
sketches two theoretical models that attempt to explain them. In Sections 4, 5 and 6 we 
examine whether the theories have any empirical content. Specifically, we examine non-
linearities in the Okun relationship and test for the existence of a NAIRU in a Phillips 
curve model. We conclude that the labour market exhibits marked cyclical asymmetries 
and that inflation is more sensitive to movements in the short-run unemployment rate 
rather than unemployment overall given other factors like import prices. 
2. The Stylised facts that confound orthodoxy 
2.1 Demand constraints 
In the midst of the on-going debates in Australia about labour market deregulation, 
minimum wages and taxation reform, the most salient, empirically robust fact that has 
pervaded the last two and a half decades is that actual GDP growth has rarely reached the 
rate required to achieve and maintain full employment (see Figure 1).5 On average there 
have been 11.1 unemployed persons per unfilled vacancy since June 1974 (Mitchell and 
Carlson, 2001). Mitchell (2001a) shows that shifts in the Australian Beveridge curve 
cannot be explained in terms of shifts in search effectiveness (Layard et al, 1991). 
Figure 1 The employment gap in Australia, 1960-2001 
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Source: ABS, The Labour Force, Australia, 6203.0, various issues. 
 5
Substantial hidden unemployment and a rising incidence of underemployment reveal that 
labour underutilisation in Australia is actually worse than the official unemployment 
figures show. The ratio of part-time to total employment has risen from 15 per cent to 
over 28 per cent since 1978. Over 54 per cent of all jobs created since 1978 have been 
part-time and the percentage of part-time employees who prefer to work but cannot find 
more hours has risen markedly over that time (Mitchell and Carlson, 2001). 
One might argue that labour market flows are such that few workers remain unemployed 
for very long. The rate and average duration of unemployment for Australia are shown in 
Figure 2. Average duration, which was 3 weeks in 1966, is now around 51 weeks. 
Figure 2 Unemployment Rate and Average Duration of Unemployment, Australia, 1959-2001 
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Source: Mitchell and Carlson (2001). Average duration (weeks) is represented by the line (RHS axis) and 
the unemployment rate (per cent) by the columns (LHS axis). 
2.2 Persistence and asymmetry 
Mitchell (1993) showed that unemployment rates from 15 OECD countries exhibit high 
degrees of persistence following negative output shocks. Further evidence is provided in 
Table 1 taken from Mitchell (2001c). The summary persistence measures (coefficients on 
the lagged unemployment rate) have increased over time and in most cases indicate high 
degrees of persistence.6 Mitchell (2001c) computes the persistence measure proposed by 
Campbell and Mankiw (1987), Cochrane (1988), and Andrews (1993), which confirm the 
high degrees of persistence in OECD unemployment rates. 
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Macroeconomic orthodoxy eschews stabilisation because it assumes that demand shocks 
are transitory and do not impede progress along the supply-determined long run path (for 
example, Kydland and Prescott, 1980). However, the evidence of high degrees of 
persistence is consistent with several studies that ‘have rejected the traditional view that 
output shocks have little or no permanent effect’ (Campbell and Mankiw, 1987).7 This 
also questions the usefulness of the NAIRU as a reliable policy tool (for example, Chang, 
1997; Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry, 2000; Fair, 2000; Mitchell, 2001a). Non-intervention 
following a negative shock is very costly when the shocks are highly persistent. 
Table 1.6 Shifting autoregressive parameters for OECD unemployment rates 
 Full Sample Pre-oil Post-oil 1970s 1980s 1990s 
   61:4 73:1 74:1 89:4 70:1 79:4 80:1 89:4 90:1 00:4 
Australia 1961:4 2000:4 0.970 0.760 0.900 0.980 0.963 0.940 
Austria 1961:4 2000:4 0.995 0.974 0.987 0.825 0.942 0.911 
Belgium 1980:4 2000:4 0.919    0.850 0.969 
Canada 1961:4 2000:4 0.988 0.959 0.947 0.894 0.954 0.990 
Denmark 1971:4 2000:4 0.961  0.824 0.956 0.845 1.026 
Finland 1961:4 2000:4 0.984 0.918 0.961 0.990 1.098 0.917 
France 1980:1 2000:4 0.947    0.927 0.973 
Germany 1963:4 2000:4 0.989 0.909 0.927 0.970 0.918 0.967 
Italy 1961:4 2000:4 0.986 0.937 0.982 0.918 0.954 0.808 
Japan 1961:4 2000:4 1.005 0.697 0.885 0.949 0.922 1.008 
Netherlands 1971:4 2000:4 0.948  0.888 0.895 0.939 1.037 
Norway 1973:4 2000:4 0.954  0.929 0.554 0.959 0.972 
Portugal 1985:1 2000:4 0.945    0.976 0.947 
Spain 1966:1 2000:4 0.991 1.046 0.964 1.002 0.884 1.020 
Sweden 1971:4 2000:4 0.991  0.975 0.910 0.992 0.922 
Switzerland 1984:4 2000:4 0.989    1.039 0.936 
United Kingdom 1961:4 2000:4 0.987 0.925 0.949 0.969 0.910 1.028 
United States 1961:4 2000:4 0.988 0.949 0.939 0.855 0.984 1.018 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators. The full samples are defined in column 2. In terms of the samples indicated in columns 4 
to 8, starting dates for estimation are determined from the full sample starting dates. For example, for Switzerland, the 1980s starts at 
1984:4. Missing values indicate no data for that sample. Some results were not reported because of too few observations (Switzerland 
and Portugal in the 1980s). The regressions included a constant term. 
Marked cyclical asymmetries are also evident in the behaviour of many macroeconomic 
time series including unemployment. This places the usefulness of standard 
macroeconomic models (incorporating NAIRU-determined supply components) which 
usually employ smooth functions with some allowance for persistence in severe doubt 
(Holly and Stannett, 1995). A number of nonlinear models have been fitted to 
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macroeconomic time series and found them superior to linear representations (Beaudry 
and Koop, 1993; Parker and Rothman, 1997; Pfann, 1993 provides a survey). There has 
also been substantial development of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) class of models 
(see Hansen, 1997) and the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) class of models (see 
Skalin and Teräsvirta, 2002). Mitchell (2002) and Mitchell and Muysken (2002d) find 
evidence of non-linearity in unemployment rates for Australia and The Netherlands.  
2.3 Duration facts 
Following the OECD Jobs Study (1994), many governments now emphasise active 
labour market programs as their response to persistently high unemployment. Mitchell 
(2001b) argues that full employability has replaced full employment as the lodestar of 
labour market policy. The individuals are now blamed for what are systemic macro 
failures. The whole thrust of active labour market policy is predicated on the belief that 
the long-term unemployed represent a structural bottleneck that can only be addressed by 
supply initiatives like training and welfare reform (OECD, 1994, 2001). Layard (1998: 
27) argues that “in the very bad old days, people thought that unemployment could be 
permanently reduced by stimulating aggregate demand … This belief has died 
everywhere … these ideas did not address the fundamental problem … The only way to 
address this problem is to make all the unemployed attractive to employers … Nothing 
else will do the trick.”8 In Figure 3, the behaviour of the official unemployment rate, the 
proportion of long-term unemployment in total unemployment (PLTU), and its short- and 
long-term components are shown.9 The evolution of PLTU is strongly influenced by 
cyclical fluctuations in Australia over the last 25 years and several studies have found 
that a rising proportion of long-term unemployment is not a separate problem from that of 
a rise in unemployment per se (Chapman et al., 1992; EPAC, 1996; and Mitchell, 2001a). 
The cyclical behaviour of short-term and long-term unemployment seems to be very 
similar. In our flows analysis below we find strong evidence to support this conclusion. 
This casts doubt on the supply-side OECD policy emphasis. While Layard (1998) may 
wish to abstract from the problem of a lack of employment opportunities, it is highly 
probable that long-term unemployment responds to exogenous (policy-driven) demand 
expansion. The evidence from the 1990s expansion in Australia and the USA very clearly 
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shows that while trend inflation remained low the proportion of long-term unemployment 
fell in lock step with the declines in the official unemployment rate (although 
underemployment rose, see Mitchell and Carlson, 2001). The strong demand led 
contraction in long-term unemployment provided no adverse inflationary impacts. 
Figure 3 Unemployment rate, PLTU, short-term and long-term unemployment rates 
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(a) Unemployment rate and PLTU 
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Source: ABS, Labour Force, Cat 6203.0. PLTU is the proportion of long-term unemployment in total 
unemployment, STUR is short-term unemployment rate and LTUR is the long-term unemployment rate. 
2.4 The failure of active labour market programs 
A major OECD report came out in 2001 endorsing the Australian government’s supply-
side approach (OECD, 2001) saying that Australia has lead the way in introducing 
“market-type mechanisms into job-broking and related employment services” (OECD, 
2001: 11).  The OECD (2001: 14) concludes that in terms of labour market policies 
Australia “has been among the OECD countries complying best” with the OECD Jobs 
Strategy (see OECD, 1994). Cowling and Mitchell (2002) argue that the plethora of 
active labour market programs has delivered very poor results in Australia (see Table 2). 
Three months after completing Intensive Assistance (B), just 11.3 per cent of individuals 
were in full-time work while 63.3 per cent remained in unemployment or had left the 
labour force. Half of the individuals who commenced Intensive Assistance in this period 
had been in the program at least once before (Senate Employment, Workplace Relations 
and Education Committee, 2002: 136). In addition, the Productivity Commission (2002: 
Chapter 9) found that the payments structure to Job Network providers has led to a 
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substantial proportion of Intensive Assistance clients being ‘parked’ while providers 
concentrate their efforts on job seekers who are easier to place in employment. 
Outcomes for the Work for the Dole program are similarly poor. Three months after 
completing the program just 11.8 per cent of participants were in full-time work and less 
than one quarter were in any form of employment. Additional data obtained from the 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations highlights the precarious nature of 
any work attained with 65 per cent of employment exits from Work for the Dole between 
1 July 2000 and 30 June 2001 going into temporary, casual and seasonal work (Senate 
Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, 2002, Question 71).  
Table 2 Post assistance labour market outcomes, Year ending September 2001 
Employed 
F/T P/T Total 
Unemployed NILF Education 
Outcomes
Program 
  
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Work for the Dole 11.8 12.8 24.6 44.0 8.3 11.6 
Job Matching 38.2 28.0 66.2 28.8 5.0 12.0 
Job Search Training 20.6 20.8 41.4 46.3 5.2 12.9 
Intensive Assistance A 18.4 25.5 43.8 36.0 12.5 8.3 
Intensive Assistance B 11.3 17.8 29.1 45.5 17.8 7.5 
Source: The DEWR Post Program Monitoring Survey conducted three months after job seekers cease 
assistance. See Cowling and Mitchell (2002) for a complete explanation. The difference between Intensive 
Assistance A and B relates to the level of disadvantage identified after interview. NILF denotes not in the 
labour force. 
The poor results for labour market programs beg the question as to why should we expect 
anything better in the absence of policy measures designed to address the quantum of 
jobs.  Improving employability does not increase the level of aggregate labour demand. 
In isolation, supply side measures merely shuffle the jobless queue. 
2.5 Gross labour market flows in Australia 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has published estimates of labour force status 
and gross changes (flows) derived from matched records on a monthly basis since 
February 1980. We initially aggregated the data into employed (E), unemployed (U) and 
not in the labour force (N) for all persons aged 15 years and older. Hence the flow EN (in 
thousands) captures the number of persons who were employed in period t and are now 
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not in the labour force in period t+1 (for example, as a result of retirement). Similarly, the 
flow UU refers to all persons who were unemployed in both periods. The flows are 
summarised in Table 3. Mitchell and Muysken (2002a) provide a full description of the 
data and the transformations that were made to reconcile sample with population and 
convert the flows into quarterly frequency compatible with the quarterly stocks.  
Table 3 Flows on the labour market with short- and long-term unemployment 
 Et+1 USt+1 ULt+1 Nt+1 
Death and 
emigration* 
Et EE EU 0 EN ED 
USt USE USUS USUL USN mUS 
ULt ULE 0 ULUL ULN mUL 
Nt NE NU 0 NN ND 
Birth and 
immigration* BE BU 0 BN  
* These are flow variables from and to outside the working age population. 
The ABS data does not break down the flows into and out of short- and long-term 
unemployment. Additional assumptions were made to infer them from the available flow 
data and the stock figures for these variables. Since the inflow into unemployment from 
employment, not in the labour force and births and immigration by definition goes 
through short-term unemployment, we could identify the corresponding flows directly 
from our data. This also implies that the short-term unemployed that remain in that 
category per period, USUSt can be identified from the data. The remaining flows, USEt, 
ULEt, USULt, ULULt, USNt and ULNt cannot be identified without further assumptions. 
To identify these flows two scenarios were created with respect to the outflow from 
unemployment to not in the labour force, reflecting two extreme assumptions. In Scenario 
1, all outflow is assumed to occur through long-term unemployment, that is USNt = 0 and 
ULNt = UNt. Scenario 2 adopts the other extreme that the outflow rate from short-term 
unemployment is equal to that of long-term unemployment. These scenarios allow us to 
calculate the flows USEt, ULEt, USULt and ULULt. They will be denoted by the subscripts 1 
and 2, respectively.  
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Figure 4 Outflow rates from not in the labour force and unemployment 
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The outflow rates from not in the labour force (NILF) and from unemployment to 
employment, unemployment and not in the labour force are shown in Figures 4(a) and 
4(b), respectively. The outflow rates from both states (not in the labour force and 
unemployment) are very similar in terms of their inertia. One sees that the incidence of 
persons remaining in the same state between periods is very high. From Figure 4(b) the 
unemployment hysteresis is pronounced (the probability of an unemployed person 
remaining remain unemployed is very high – varying between 60 and 70 per cent). This 
probability also displays clear counter-cyclical movement, which provides evidence 
against a rigid NAIRU characterisation (Mitchell, 2001a). The outflow rates into 
employment and into NILF from unemployment are both around 20 per cent and vary 
pro-cyclically. Finally, the outflow rates from employment are very similar to those from 
NILF as shown in Figure 4(a). 
Short-term unemployment makes up the largest part of unemployment (around 75 per 
cent on average). In Figures 5(a) and 5(b) we consider the flows in and out of this state in 
more detail. It is remarkable that all outflow rates are quite stable over time despite of the 
strong fluctuations in short-time unemployment. The outflow rate from short-term 
unemployment is around 50 per cent. Outflow to employment and LTU is about 30 per 
cent with the remainder going into NILF (in Scenario 2). When we compare the outflow 
to employment and LTU to the outflow rate of total unemployment to employment in 
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Figure 4(b) it is very striking that the latter is always lower over this sample. This implies 
that even in the most optimistic scenario, employment growth has never been sufficient to 
absorb the outflow from short-term unemployment. Thus a crucial assumption of Ball’s 
analysis, which we discuss below, is inconsistent with our observations. This is consistent 
with the first stylised fact noted above – that the Australian economy has operated within 
the constraints of major demand deficiency since the mid-1975s and even when 
employment growth is ‘strong’ it is not strong enough! 
Figure 5 Inflows into and outflows from short-term unemployment 
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(b) Outflow rates from STU 
STU refers to short-term unemployment. The inflows are in thousands and the outflows are in rates (probabilities). 
ORUSC2 is the outflow rate from STU to employment and LTU under Scenario 2 and ORUSN2 is the outflow rate 
from STU to NILF under Scenario 2. 
3. Non-linear models of labour market dynamics and inflation 
The stylised facts outlined in Section 2 pose considerable difficulties for the standard 
macroeconomic models of time series behaviour (that underpin the NAIRU concept). In 
this section we outline two models which do not generate a unique NAIRU, yet consider 
asymmetric behaviour with a focus on how the labour market conditions the inflation 
process. First, Ball (1999) presents a model which focuses solely on labour market 
behaviour. Short-term unemployment is the wage pressure variable in his expectations-
augmented Phillips curve. A unique level of short-term unemployment consistent with 
stable inflation may exist, but total unemployment can take on any value. The NAIRU, as 
defined in the conventional sense, is thus undetermined. Moreover, employment shocks 
impact asymmetrically on inflation via their non-linear impacts on short-term 
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unemployment. Mitchell and Muysken (2002a) extend the model by incorporating the 
impact of cyclical changes in the labour force to derive an extra channel through which 
changes in employment affect both short-run unemployment and the rate of inflation; and 
by developing a more sophisticated Phillips curve. 
Second, we develop a growth model which explains cyclical asymmetries but which is 
driven by product market developments. The components of our Post Keynesian model 
are investment uncertainty operating with a segmented labour market where employment 
in both labour segments behaves similarly but where the primary labour market 
conditions the wage determination process. 
3.1 Labour market dynamics in Ball (1999) and Mitchell and Muysken (2002a) 
Ball (1999) develops a model based on annual periods to show that symmetrical 
aggregate demand movements have asymmetric impacts on short-term unemployment, 
defined as a spell of unemployment up to 12 months in duration. With the labour force 
constant, employment growth ensures that short-term unemployment equals the normal 
net flows in and out of employment (separations and hires). However, when employment 
changes are negative these net flows are supplemented by job losses. Due to the annual 
periods, all hires in this model are from long-term unemployment. 
Mitchell and Muysken (2002a) convert the model into quarterly periods and derive the 
impact of cyclical labour force participation rate changes on short-term unemployment by 
including flows from employment (E) and unemployment (U) to not in the labour force 
(N)  (that is, retirements, discouraged workers, quits). The labour force, LF in any quarter 
is given as 1 1 1t t t tLF LF qE vU X− − −= − − +  with q the EN flow and v the UN flow. We 
define X as an exogenous labour force change (for example, due to demographic changes, 
migration). The maximum capacity of employment to absorb X is given by 1t tE qE −∆ + , 
given that retirements free up existing jobs (qEt-1). Αs 1 1t t tX LF qE vU− −= ∆ + +  (from the 
labour force equation), we conclude that unemployment will rise unless 1t tE qE X−∆ + ≥ . 
The demarcation between growth and contraction is thus 1t t tE LF vU −∆ ≥ ∆ + , which says 
that the change in employment has to equal the change in labour force plus the number of 
unemployed who dropped out of the workforce. 
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Unemployment in any quarter is given by the following stock-flow accounting 
expressions depending on which regime (expansion or contraction) binds: 
(1a) If ( )1 1 1 1 1 1( ) 1t t t t t t t tE LF vU U U sE r v U sE r v U− − − − − −∆ ≥ ∆ + = + − + = + − −  
(1b) If ( ) ( )1 1 1 11t t t t t t tE LF vU U sE LF vU E r v U− − − −∆ < ∆ + = + ∆ + − ∆ + − −  
where s is the flow from E to U and r is the flow from U to E. If we consider the labour 
market flows in quarterly terms yet define the stock of short-term unemployment in 
annual terms, then the extra short-term unemployment in each quarter is given 
as [ ]1 1 1, ( )t t t t tmax sE sE LF vU E− − −+ ∆ + − ∆ . Recursive substitution from Equations (1a) 
and (1b) then gives short-term unemployment as:10 
(2) 
14
1 1
1 1 1
(1 ) ,
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
j
t j
j j
j t j t j t j t j
s r v E
max
s r v E r v LF vU E
−
−
− −
= − + − − + −
 − − − − + − − ∆ + − ∆∑  
Equation (2) shows that employment shocks have asymmetric impacts on short term 
unemployment which intensify once the impacts on the labour force are included. 
This model thus yields the following predictions which can be empirically tested: 
1. There are distinct regimes given by Equation (2) where short-term unemployment 
behaves asymmetrically in relation to an employment shock; 
2. Employers hire by initially exhausting the short-term unemployed (except 
separations) and then begin to employ the long-term unemployed; and 
3. Mitchell and Muysken (2002a) also show how this model of labour market dynamics 
when combined with a typical “battle of the mark-ups” Phillips curve predicts only 
short-term unemployment matters for inflation and this is determined by employment 
growth. Long-term unemployment can take any value, without having an impact on 
inflation. In other words, there is no unique NAIRU. 
The discussion in Section 2.5 concerning the relative magnitudes of gross flows, in 
particular, the flows from short-term unemployment to employment compared to those 
from total unemployment reject prediction 2 and by implication prediction 1. Prediction 
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3, which is also consistent with our alternative model developed in the Section 3.2, is 
tested in Section 5. 
3.2 Investment driven growth with cyclical asymmetries 
In this section we outline an alternative model, which consistently accounts for these 
facts and shows how product market asymmetries, driven by investment irreversibility, 
transmit into a segmented labour market. The cyclical employment response in both 
segments is positive but asymmetric and primary labour market wage setting conditions 
overall wage movements (see Mitchell and Muysken, 2002c). Adopting an environment 
of investment uncertainty, Mitchell and Muysken (2002c) show that the rate of capacity 
utilisation drives asymmetric movements in investment. This relationship recalls the 
asymmetric multiplier-accelerator models developed by Goodwin in the early 1950s (see 
Allen, 1968). The model is simplistic in that output shocks drive investment with no role 
allowed for relative prices or Tobin’s q. Our q is the rate of capacity utilisation. Our aim 
is to highlight a typically ignored mechanism – the impact of capacity utilisation on 
investment and the consequences for the output dynamics.  
The puzzle that has to be addressed is this: 
• Both the employment prospects of the short-term and long-term unemployment 
improve in the upturn. There is no evidence to suggest that economic growth comes 
up against a bottleneck imposed by intractable pools of long-term unemployed; 
• Both pools of unemployment behave asymmetrically which points to policy that 
should avoid prolonged and/or deep cyclical swings;  
• The inflation restraint is provided by the short-term unemployed and the 
underemployed, rather than the long-term unemployed; and  
• Active labour market programs do not reduce unemployment in isolation of strong 
economic growth. 
In this paper, we sketch the model. Production capacity Yt increases with investment It, 
such that: 
(3) 1t t tY Y vIδ −∆ = − +  
where δ is the depreciation rate and v is the productivity of investment. Actual output Xt 
cannot exceed capacity output. 
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We assume that investors facing endemic uncertainty make large irreversible capital 
outlays, which leads them to be cautious in times of pessimism and to use broad safety 
margins. They form expectations of future profitability by considering the current q 
against their ‘normal q’. Accordingly, firms only invest when capacity utilisation, 
/q X Y= exceeds its normal level q* < 1. In that case investors make up for the lack of 
capacity at a rate λ , which gives the following investment function: 
(4) ( )* *1 1 1
*
1
/ (1/ ) ( / )
(1/ )
t t t t
t
I Y v v q q q q
v q q
δ λ
δ
− − −
−
= + − >
= ≤
 
So investment varies with capacity utilisation within bounds and therefore productive 
capacity grows at rate which is bounded from below and above. The asymmetric 
investment behaviour thus generates asymmetries in capacity growth because productive 
capacity only grows when there is a shortage of capacity (q > q*) and Equations (3) and 
(4) imply that productive capacity grows at a rate: 
(5) ( )* *1 1 1
*
1
/
0
yt t t t t
t
g Y Y q q q q
q q
λ− − −
−
= ∆ = − >
= ≤
 
In analysing output growth, we employ a simple Keynesian savings function but that all 
groups, consumers, firms and government can save. Firms and consumers will invest 
when investment is attractive and dissave their hoardings. When investment is not 
feasible, they will hoard their net savings (hold cash balances as a time vehicle against 
uncertainty). 
In the case of capacity shortage, output growth exceeds capacity growth and as the 
economy reaches full capacity, output growth slows to the rate that binds capacity 
growth. The corresponding fall in investment causes output to decrease, such that 
utilisation falls below normal capacity. At that point, net investment stalls, capacity 
output is hardly growing and output growth can catch up until normal capacity is again 
reached. Autonomous expenditures (A) can accelerate this process. Then the cycle starts 
again. The reaction of output to changes in the rate of capacity utilisation is also 
asymmetric, due to the investment asymmetries. The above process is summarised in 
Figure 6a. In this model, macroeconomic policy works through A. If there are public 
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surpluses, increases in capacity utilisation and productive capacity require the private 
sector to become increasingly indebted. This growth path is unsustainable as private 
agents will ultimately seek to restore the quality of their balance sheets by increasing 
their saving (see Mitchell and Mosler, 2002; Mitchell and Reedman, 2002). Asymmetry 
can also enter via a treasury reaction function conditioned by an obsessive pursuit of 
public surpluses. If investment falls, the cyclical deficit will increase. If the government 
reacts by tightening fiscal policy to push the budget back towards surplus, then non-linear 
spending effects will emerge. 
Figure 6 An aggregate demand model of with asymmetric labour market responses 
 
What are the labour market dynamics in this model? We distinguish between primary 
labour market (PLM) and secondary labour market (SLM) employment, Ep and Es, 
respectively. Both labour markets are functionally linked with the SLM contracting and 
expanding to meet the flux and uncertainty of aggregate demand. This allows PLM 
employers to offer more attractive work conditions, including stability of tenure, which is 
cost effective to these firms given that they incur training costs to ensure workers have 
job-specific skills. 
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Total employment in persons is: 
(6) p sE E E= +  
Total hours worked (where h denotes hours worked per person) is: 
(7) p p s shE h E h E= +  
Here hp measures the standard working week, reflecting the assumption that primary 
workers are predominantly full-time workers. Given the part-time nature of likely 
secondary jobs in the service sector we consider s ph h< , allowing underemployment to 
exist. 
Firms treat primary jobs as quasi-fixed due to positive adjustment costs and hire in 
proportion to normal productive capacity, given labour productivity pta per hour: 
(8)  pp t tE a Y=  
For simplicity, the growth in labour productivity pta is secular and above aggregate labour 
productivity per hour at, which is a weighted average of pta and
s
ta , second labour 
productivity. Secondary workers are employed in proportion with actual output given that 
they have no tenure: 
(9) ss t tE a X=  
Aggregate labour productivity thus varies pro-cyclically with capacity utilisation, around 
the same secular trend. The cyclical variation is caused by adjustment costs in 
employment. The employment equations highlight the role of capacity utilisation and can 
be extended to include labour costs, although we consider that income effects dominate 
substitution effects. 
Capacity utilisation has a pro-cyclical impact on both primary and secondary 
employment although the former is less sensitive to cyclical variations. Both types of 
employment show asymmetric cyclical responses. Firms adjust , , ,s s p ph E h E  in that 
order. Since primary workers are assumed to work the standard work week, employment 
measured in persons and total hours exhibits similar variations and is fairly stable. Some 
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hoarding of primary workers is expected in a downturn. In contrast, firms may quickly 
adjust part-time working hours and layoff secondary workers as actual output falls. As a 
consequence, hours worked per secondary worker exhibit pro-cyclical fluctuations and 
capacity utilisation bears part of the employment adjustment costs. However, the cyclical 
sensitivity of hours worked per person is below that of total hours worked. Thus, the 
demand for persons in the secondary labour market fluctuates asymmetrically with the 
cycle. The asymmetry may exist but be less pronounced for primary workers. This 
process is summarised in Figure 6b. 
Mitchell and Muysken (2002a) establish that the labour force participation rate responds 
symmetrically to employment shocks and thus changes in the labour force result from 
both shocks in employment growth and in population growth (P) (Figure 6d). So the 
asymmetries in employment demand are reinforced by labour force sensitivity which 
makes it harder to reduce unemployment after a severe trough. Changes in capacity 
utilisation thus impact on unemployment through two channels. First, an increase in 
capacity utilisation will increase employment (Figure 6b). Second, increased employment 
will induce a higher participation rate and a larger labour force (Figure 6d). Since the 
latter indirect effect is weaker than the initial direct effect, unemployment will decrease. 
This model generates the stocks in , ,p sN E E and U. In Figure 6c the interaction of output 
(employment) demand and the labour force dynamics determines total unemployment 
(U), which is divided by duration into short-term (STU) and long-term (LTU) 
components. This can be married to the labour market flow dynamics (see Table 3 above) 
to explore and simulate the dynamics of unemployment in more detail. In particular, we 
model the relevant outflow rates and use the primary and secondary employment 
distinction to generate short- and long-term unemployment. We hypothesise that the LTU 
will more likely be low-skilled with unstable work histories and most exposed to cyclical 
variations because they typically work in secondary jobs when employed. The STU 
compete for jobs in both labour markets but generally prefer to work in primary jobs. 
Both labour markets expand with positive investment spending and so both 
unemployment pools contract. However, primary labour market workers dominate the 
determination of wage outcomes in the economy with secondary market wages following. 
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Since only short-term unemployment is relevant in the primary market, wages will react 
primarily to short-term unemployment instead of total unemployment. 
The final puzzle is then explained. This is the basis of the Phillips curve estimated by 
Mitchell (2001a, 2002), Mitchell and Carlson (2002) and Mitchell and Muysken (2002a) 
examined below. Long-term unemployment is sensitive to capacity utilisation and 
capacity growth but does constrain inflation. Ball (1999: 240) says “hysteresis is 
reversible: a demand expansion can reduce the NAIRU” because “they … [employers] … 
would rather pay the training costs than leave the jobs vacant” (Ball, 1999: 230). A 
similar observation underpins the hysteresis models in Mitchell (1987, 1993). In a high 
pressure economy, firms lower hiring standards and address any skill deficiencies by 
offering on-the-job training. 
4. Recovery Response Analysis 
Since cyclical asymmetries play an important role in our analysis it is useful to more 
closely examine the behaviour of unemployment and other Okun aggregates (real output 
growth, labour force growth and employment growth) over the last three business cycles 
in Australia. We summarise the results in Figure 7. The three troughs were June 1974, 
March 1981 and September 1991, respectively (see Mitchell, 2001a for an explanation of 
the derivation). The time series shown are indexed to take the value of 100 at each 
trough. The charts then are of the evolution of the respective index numbers from 12 
quarters before the trough and then to 12 quarters after the trough. The relationship 
between output growth and unemployment is then more clearly seen. 
We observe asymmetric behaviour in unemployment over each cycle. In 1974 and 1981, 
unemployment was relatively constant but increased sharply afterwards, the magnitude 
determined by the relationship between real output, labour force and employment growth.  
In 1974, the labour force continued to grow and had not become as cyclically-sensitive as 
it is now (the rise in married female participants had just begun). However, the firms shed 
significant numbers of workers they had been hoarding and the employment growth rate 
was negative to low for several quarters after the trough. 
Figure 7 Business cycle responses in Australia, Index (Trough = 100) 
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In 1981, a similar pattern unfolded although the firms were already lean and so 
employment growth was higher in the upturn. In both cycles, real output growth behaved 
similar before and after the trough. In the 1991 downturn, real output growth showed a 
typical pattern but the growth in unemployment was significantly reduced largely due to 
the labour force growth rate had slowed substantially. However, employment growth 
remained sluggish as in the previous recoveries. The evidence depicted in Figure 7 thus 
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suggests that the Australian labour market is prone to slow recoveries even when real 
output growth is positive after the trough. There is a high degree of persistence in 
unemployment once shocked and employment takes a significant period to recover from 
the negative demand shock. 
5. Non linear Okun relationships in Australia 
The model developed in Section 3 suggests that output dynamics drive asymmetric 
changes labour underutilisation while the analysis presented in Section 4 suggests that the 
Okun relationship in Australia is non-linear. Watts and Mitchell (1991) estimated the 
steady-state unemployment via a cointegration equation and simulated estimated steady-
state unemployment rates for different time periods dependent on the average values 
taken by the explanatory variables including the rate of capacity utilisation, the degree of 
structural mismatch and the rate of growth of overall productive capacity. They showed 
the dominance of cyclical factors in explaining the shift of the NAIRU over the sample 
period. The accompanying estimated short-run error correction (ECM) model found 
strong evidence of hysteresis in the shifting Okun relation. They did not however 
consider an asymmetric relationship. More recently, Shorderet (2001) and Virén (2001) 
have modelled asymmetric effects in an Okun model, although their approaches differ. 
However, both use a cointegration ECM framework to show that the unemployment rate 
reacts in a non-symmetric manner to positive and negative changes in real output.  
To provide some empirical content to the model sketched in Section 3 we estimate an 
asymmetrical Okun-type model after using a grid search to detect the rate of real GDP 
growth that triggers the asymmetry in its impact on the labour market. Our model builds 
on Watts and Mitchell (1991) and Shorderet (2001). We find that the best demarcation 
occurs between positive and negative real GDP growth rates. Watts and Mitchell (1991) 
argued that Okun’s law as originally specified ignored the movements in the trend rate of 
potential output growth. Slower capacity growth can be expected to lead to a rise in the 
rate of unemployment, in the long run, even if capacity utilization remains constant. This 
would suggest that the unemployment rate is influenced by long-run cyclical factors, in 
addition to short-run variations in capacity utilisation. Further, the process of structural 
change which affects the industrial composition of employment and its composition by 
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sex and part-time and full-time status would also be expected to influence the 
unemployment/capacity utilization nexus in the long run. 
5.1 The Model 
We begin with a simple (linearised) model of unemployment: 
(10) 0t t t tu y z eα β γ β= + + + <  
where u is the unemployment rate, y is the log of real output, z is a vector of other factors 
influencing the unemployment rate (including growth in capacity output and also 
structural change in the labour market), and e is a white-noise error term. A steady-state 
value of u in Equation (10) can thus be derived conditional on the values taken by the 
explanatory variables (see Watts and Mitchell, 1991). 
We hypothesise that the growth in real output (∆y) impacts asymmetrically on the 
unemployment rate according to the following regimes: 
(11) t
t
if y s
if y s
ββ β
+
−
 ∆ >=  ∆ <
 
where s is some switching point (we report only the demarcation between positive and 
negative output growth rates). The stylised facts and the relations implied by the 
theoretical model outlined in Section 3 would suggest that: 
(11a) β β+ −<  
Unemployment dynamics are thus specified as: 
(12) 0
1 0 0 0
m n n n
t i t i j P t j j N t j j t j t
i j j j
u c u I y I y z vα β β γ+ −− − − −
= = = =
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
The indicator functions IP and IN are designed to switch regimes and allow for 
asymmetry. They are specified as: 
(13) 
1 0, , 0 0, ,
0 0, , 1 0, ,
t i t i
P N
t i t i
if y s i p if y s i p
I I
if y s i p if y s i p
− −
− −
∆ > = ∆ > = = = ∆ < = ∆ < = 
… …
… …  
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Shorderet (2001) uses 
1
0
1
t
t t i
i
u u u
−
−
=
= + ∆∑ to show that Equation (10) can be rewritten as: 
(10a) t t t t tu y y z eα β β γ+ + − −= + + + +  
where 0 0u yzα = − , , 
1
0
t
t P t j
j
y I y
−+
−
=
= ∆∑ , and 1
0
t
t N t j
j
y I y
−−
−
=
= ∆∑ . 
Equation (10a) raises some issues. Given that the unemployment rate is bounded one 
could assume a priori it is stationary (see Mitchell, 1993). In this case, to balance 
Equation (10a) there would have to be cointegration among the other integrated variables 
(like , ty y
+ − , both of which appear to be I(1) after unit root testing). Given the hysteresis, 
the unemployment rate exhibits a strong trend. Yet after de-trending, it still appears to be 
non-stationary. Equation (10a) can thus be interpreted as a cointegrating regression if the 
residuals are stationary. We can then test Equation (12) in error correction form. Unit root 
also showed that the growth in productive capacity (DPG) was I(1). The measure of 
structural change was not significant in any regression and is not discussed further. 
5.2 Estimation Results 
The results for Equation 10(a) are shown in Table 4 and provide tentative support for the 
contention that the Okun relation in Australia is non linear. 
Table 4 Non linear Okun regression, Dependent variable UR (%), 1961:3 2002:2. 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 0.145 17.9 
Y+ -0.071 11.4 
Y- -0.463 15.0 
Potential capacity growth -2.418 17.3 
Time 0.001 8.8 
R2 0.93  
S.E. as % mean Dep Var. 13.8  
DW 0.184  
Note: Potential capacity growth is the log of the current value divided by the fourth lagged value (see 
Mitchell, 2001a for the derivation). Time is a linear time trend. A dummy in 1982:4 was included to 
account for an outlier. The dependent variable was the unemployment rate. 
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The residuals were tested for stationarity using the ADF and KPSS tests. The ADF test 
statistic was -3.336444 (5 per cent critical value = -2.879155) and the KPSS test statistic 
was 0.079060 (5 per cent critical value = 0.146). We thus cannot reject the null of 
cointegration. 
We then added the lagged residuals from the estimated Equation (10a) to Equation (12) 
and tested down. The results are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 Okun adjustment function, Dependent Variable ∆UR, 1961:4 to2002:2 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant -0.000 0.85 
∆Y+(-1) -0.001 0.21 
∆Y- -0.24 4.16 
∆UR(-1) 0.27 3.52 
ECM (-1) -0.05 1.87 
R2 0.39  
If the dependent variable is the annual change in the unemployment rate the results 
improve somewhat and both output growth terms are significant. The error correction 
term is marginally significant and correctly signed The results in Table 5 are indicative 
only. We also tested for cointegration between , ty y
+ −  and found marginal evidence for 
that. This means that the results in Table 4 are relatively insensitive to our assumption 
about the order of integration of the unemployment rate. Mitchell and Carlson (2002) 
provide more development of this model and compare it to an asymmetric structural 
VAR representation. 
In conclusion, the results presented in this section are supportive of the idea that 
hysteresis and asymmetry in unemployment are driven by output shocks.  
6. Phillips curve analysis 
The model sketched in Section 3 suggests that the long-term unemployed do not put 
pressure on inflation yet their employment prospects respond to demand stimulus. Ball 
(1999: 240) says “hysteresis is reversible: a demand expansion can reduce the NAIRU” 
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because “they … [employers] … would rather pay the training costs than leave the jobs 
vacant” (Ball, 1999: 230). A similar observation underpins the hysteresis models in 
Mitchell (1987, 1993). In a high pressure economy, firms lower hiring standards and 
address the skill deficiencies of the long-term unemployment by offering on-the-job 
training. If the long term unemployed do not place pressure on inflation, then, at best only 
a unique level of short-term unemployment consistent with stable inflation may exist. 
The uniqueness of this level depends on other behavioural aspects of the inflationary 
process, in particular whether the estimated models are homogenous with respect to 
expectations and whether hysteresis is present or not (see Fair, 2000; Mitchell, 2001a). 
In this section, we thus examine four major contentions: 
1. Does the short-term unemployment rate provide a stronger constraint on the annual 
inflation rate relative to the overall unemployment rate? 
2. Does the long-term unemployment rate exert any statistically significant impact on 
the annual inflation rate? We expect the coefficient on the long-term unemployment 
rate in a Phillips curve model to be statistically insignificant. 
3. Does the TV-NAIRU model of the evolution of excess demand provide an inferior 
explanation of the inflation process compared to the models developed under 
hypothesis (1)? We expect an inflation models using the gap between the short-term 
unemployment and its filtered trend to be superior to that which uses the gap between 
the official unemployment rate and its filtered trend as the excess demand measure. 
The latter variable is typically used in TV-NAIRU studies (see Mitchell, 2001a). 
4. Does the estimated Phillips curve exhibit NAIRU dynamics? Fair (2000) and Mitchell 
(2001a) present tests based on the coefficients on the lagged dependent inflation 
variable to determine whether the inflation dynamics are consistent with a constant 
NAIRU model. The test is a simple homogeneity test on the lagged inflation terms. 
We use a general autoregressive-distributed lag Phillips curve representation like: 
(14) 
1 0 0
qn m
t i t i i t i i t i t
i i i
p p u zα δ β γ ε− − −
= = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑   
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where tp is the rate of inflation at time t, u is the unemployment rate, z is a cost shock 
variables (like import price inflation, capital costs), and the ε is a white-noise error term.  
In addition, the u variable can take the form of the aggregate unemployment rate or the 
short-term unemployment rate to facilitate the testing of the hypotheses (1) to (3) outlined 
above. In the case of hypothesis (3) we compute UR* and STUR* using a Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter on the official unemployment rate, UR and the short-term 
unemployment rate, STUR, respectively. The variables (UR - UR*) and (STUR - STUR*) 
are the original series less the HP filtered trend series in each case. 
Further, if the δ coefficients sum to unity, the model gives a constant NAIRU 
of
0
m
ii
α β=− ∑ . At this unemployment rate, the inflation rate will only exhibit short-run 
changes due to changes in changes in z and/or random shocks (changes in ε). So we can 
test hypothesis (4) by testing for homogeneity. 
We initially develop a Phillips curve model for Australia using Equation (14) using 4 lags 
on the annualised inflation terms (D4LP) and import prices (D4LPM), the level of the 
unemployment rate, a dummy variable, DGST (defined as 1 in 2000:3 and zero 
otherwise) to take into account the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax system in 
Australia in July 2000, and other variables capturing the cost of capital, interest spread, 
and payroll taxes and the like. The other variables were not retained in the final tested-
down specification. Sequential testing down from the general equation using different 
measures of the unemployment variable yielded the results shown in Table 6. In each 
case, the dynamics were so close and the coefficient estimates for the other variables 
were highly stable that a common specification is employed, which aids comparison 
considerably. The diagnostics of all equations were satisfactory. 
Equation (6.1) in Table 6 describes a typical Phillips curve using the aggregate 
unemployment rate (UR). The unemployment rate exerts a negative influence on the rate 
of inflation (-0.18). A comparison with Equation (6.2) which splits the unemployment 
rate into short-term and long-term components shows that the LTUR is not statistically 
significant. Further, the degree of negative pressure on inflation exerted by the highly 
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significant STUR rises to -0.53, substantially above that estimated for UR. Equations (6.3) 
and (6.4) are inferior specifications and warrant no specific comment. 
Mitchell (2002) argues that the NAIRU concept remains on shaky theoretical grounds. 
Importantly, the original theory underpinning the NAIRU provides no guidance about its 
evolution although, we would be looking to the evolution of unspecified structural factors 
to remain faithful to that theory. In this theoretical void, econometricians have used 
techniques that allow for a smooth evolution although there is no particular 
correspondence with any actual economic factors. Some authors assert that a Hodrick-
Prescott filter through the actual series captures the TV-NAIRU (for example Boone, 
2000 among many). Of-course, the Hodrick-Prescott filter merely tracks the underlying 
trend of the unemployment and follows it down just as surely as it follows it up. The 
unemployment rate is highly cyclical and the TV-NAIRU proponents are silent on this 
apparent anomaly – why do the alleged structural factors cycle with the actual rate? 
Equations (6.5) and (6.6) use the alternative form of the unemployment variables in terms 
of the actual value (of UR and STUR) being expressed as gaps on their respective filtered 
trend values. These regressions constitute an improvement on (1) to (4). Equation (6.5) is 
thus in the TV-NAIRU vein and performs reasonably in statistical terms. The coefficient 
on the demand pressure gap (UR - UR*) is -0.409, substantially higher than that estimated 
for Equation (6.1). However, Equation (6.5) is inferior to Equation (6.6) that replaces 
(UR - UR*) with the short-term unemployment rate gap (STUR - STUR*). This has a 
lower standard error of estimate and the deviation of STUR from its current (shifting) HP-
filtered value, STUR* is -0.648. In other words, a 1 per cent deviation above the filtered 
value leads to a 0.64 per cent slowdown in the annualised inflation rate. It is interesting to 
consider the different values of the coefficients on the STUR and UR variables. The 
following dynamics are suggested. A downturn increases short-term unemployment 
sharply, which reduces inflation because the inflow into short-term unemployment is 
comprised of those currently employed and active in wage bargaining processes. As the 
downturn continues, the duration of unemployment rises and the pressure exerted on the 
wage setting system by unemployment overall falls. This requires higher levels of short-
term unemployment being created to reach low inflation targets with the consequence of 
increasing proportions of long-term unemployment being created. 
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The results taken together provide strong support for the hypotheses (1) to (3) outlined 
above and for the theoretical model developed in Section 3. 
Table 6 Phillips curve regressions, Australia, 1978:1 to 2001:4 
 (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) 
 UR STUR-LTUR STUR LTUR URGAP STURGAP
Constant 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (2.96) (3.77) (3.53) (1.91) (1.62) (1.21)  
∆4LP(-1) 0.88 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.91  
 (29.4) (25.6) (32.9) (25.4) (32.9) (35.1) 
UR -0.18      
 (2.84)      
UR-UR*     -0.409  
     (4.10)  
STUR  -0.53 -0.35    
  (3.22) (3.42)    
STUR-STUR*      -0.648 
      (4.53) 
LTUR  0.30  -0.25   
  (1.36)  (1.72)   
∆4LPM 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
 (4.13) (4.31) (4.26) (3.94) (4.98) (4.83) 
DGST 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (2.46) (2.49) (2.43) (2.60) (2.63) (2.72) 
       
 R-Squared 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 
 S.E. of regression 0.00814 0.00796 0.00821 0.00836 007806 0.00767 
 se % mean 15.0 14.7 15.1 15.4 14.4 14.1 
 SC LM(1) 2.24 0.35 0.47 3.51 0.50 0.06 
 ARCH 4) 0.49 0.99 0.70 0.38 0.51 0.88 
 RESET(2) F 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.35 0.19 
       
NAIRU dynamics test      
F-statistic 14.9 3.3 15.3 11.0 16.3 13.1 
d.f. (1,90) (1, 90)   (1, 92)  (1, 91)  (1,91) (1,91) 
Prob-value 0.0000 0.0711 0.0002 0.0013 0.0001 0.0005 
Notes: SC LM(1) is a Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation 1st order LM Test, ARCH(4) is a 4th order test for Autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity, RESET(2) is the Ramsey RESET test with 2 added terms, t-statistics are in parentheses. UR* and 
STUR* were computed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter on the UR and STUR, respectively. The variables UR-UR* and STUR-STUR* 
are the original series less the HP filtered trend series in each case.4. 
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An additional finding is that a long-term trade-off between unemployment and inflation is 
implied in all regressions. The NAIRU dynamics test statistic shown in Table 6 allows us 
to easily reject the null that the sum of the coefficients on the lagged inflation terms is 
unity in all regressions. In that sense, we would reject the constant NAIRU hypothesis.11 
So even though the short-term unemployment rate is relatively more effective in 
controlling inflation, there is no convergence to a constant equilibrium rate of short-term 
unemployment after an employment shock. The transitory equilibrium short-term 
unemployment rate is contingent on the evolution of employment growth and demand in 
general. Combined with the other findings relating to hypotheses (1) to (3) and the 
underlying model in Section 3, we interpret these results as being consistent with a 
hysteretic vision of the inflationary dynamics in Australia. The results indicate that a 
deflationary strategy using demand repression (tight monetary and fiscal policy) will be 
costly in terms of unemployment. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have considered two theoretical models in relation to the key stylised 
facts of the Australian labour market. The model motivated by Ball (1999) and enhanced 
by Mitchell and Muysken (2002a), while developing asymmetries and the importance of 
employment shocks, fails because of the extent of demand deficiency that is evident in 
the Australian economy. In others, the persistence of unemployment and the bias in short-
term unemployment towards long duration means that the constrained employment 
growth cannot generate sufficient flows out of unemployment. Part of the problem with 
Ball’s analysis is that the source of asymmetry is confined to the labour market 
(employment shocks). The alternative model sketched emphasises investment 
asymmetries driven by product market shocks which interact with a segmented labour 
market. This model embraces demand deficiency and explains the other stylised facts 
more easily. It also reconcile the two facts that short-term and long-term unemployment 
behave similarly over the cycle, yet only short-term unemployment appears to discipline 
the inflation process. Our model poses major problems for the supply-side orthodoxy, 
which posits that the long-term unemployed represent a structural bottleneck and only 
supply initiatives like training and welfare reform can be effective. 
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The initial empirical modelling provides support for the theoretical model and suggests 
further research is needed to more precisely estimate the asymmetries (see Mitchell, 
2002). The Okun relation linking output shocks to the labour market is non-linear 
(asymmetric) but more work is needed to estimate the dynamics of the model.  
Data Appendix 
Gross Domestic Product 
Real Gross Domestic Product at 1999/00 prices taken from the ABS TRYM database. 
Investment 
Private Final Capital Expenditure at 1999/00 prices is the sum of total expenditure on 
Plant and Equipment, Other Building and Construction, and Intangible Fixed Assets all 
taken from the ABS TRYM database. 
Inflation measures 
The annual inflation rate is expressed as the four-quarter log change in the Consumer 
Price Index. The alternative inflation measure is the Final Consumption Deflator from the 
National Accounts. Both time series are taken from the ABS TRYM database 
Import price index 
The import price index is expressed as the four-quarter log change in the TRYM Model 
Import Price Index (1990/91 = 1) taken from the ABS TRYM database. 
Labour Market Variables 
All the labour force data are taken from the ABS Time Series Service available via 
AUSSTATS. The short-term unemployment rate is computed as official unemployment 
minus long-term unemployment expressed as a percentage of the labour force. Long-term 
unemployment is defined as a spell of unemployment longer than 52 weeks. The 
derivation of the underemployment measure is explained in Carlson and Mitchell (2001, 
Chapter 2). 
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Unit Root Tests 
The time series properties of the data are presented in Tables A1 and A2 using 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) 
tests, respectively. 
Table A1 Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests, unit root null 
Variable Sample period ADF Test Statistic Prob Value 
UR 1960:2 2002:2 -2.273315 0.4458 
∆UR 1960:2 2002:2 -5.841232 0.0000 
STUR 1978:4 2002:2 -3.134663 0.1044 
∆STUR 1978:4 2002:2 -4.271421 0.0053 
LTUR 1978:4 2002:2 -3.225853 0.0857 
∆LTUR 1978:4 2002:2 -3.559033 0.0390 
LGDP  1959:4 2002:2 -2.236085 0.4662 
∆1LGDP 1960:1 2002:2 -13.58206 0.0000 
∆4LGDP 1964:1 2002:2 -3.092182 0.1119 
∆∆4LGDP 1963:4 2002:2 -6.728708 0.0000 
∆4LGDP+ 1962:4 2002:2 -3.113124 0.1068 
∆∆4LGDP+ 1962:3 2002:2 -8.215189 0.0000 
∆4LGDP- 1960:4 2002:2 -6.025852 0.0000 
∆∆4LGDP- 1961:4 2002:2 -10.39052 0.0000 
LSTOIKOV 1967:4 2002:2 -6.276242 0.0000 
LCPI 1970:2 2001:3 -0.188963 0.9927 
∆1LCPI 1970:2 2001:3 -4.685111 0.0012 
∆4LCPI 1971:4 2002:4 -3.052257 0.1227 
∆∆4LCPI 1971:4 2002:4 -6.651723 0.0000 
LIPD 1960:4 2002:2 -2.023077 0.5841 
∆1LIPD 1960:4 2002:2 -1.916006 0.6417 
∆4LIPD 1963:1 2002:2 -1.971998 0.6117 
∆∆4LIPD 1963:1 2002:2 −4.074648 0.0084 
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Table A2 Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin Tests, trend stationary null 
Variable Sample period LM test statistic 5 per cent 
significance 
UR 1959:3 2002:2 0.201383  
∆UR 1959:4 2002:2 0.072614 * 
STUR 1978:1 2002:2 0.118303 * 
∆STUR 1978:2 2002:2 0.041691 * 
LTUR 1978:1 2002:2 0.157232  
∆LTUR 1978:2 2002:2 0.041400 * 
LGDP  1959:3 2002:2 0.261209  
∆1LGDP 1959:4 2002:2 0.105416 * 
∆4LGDP 1960:3 2002:2 0.114089 * 
∆∆4LGDP 1960:4 2002:2 0.246493  
∆4LGDP+ 1960:3 2002:2 0.118997 * 
∆∆4LGDP+ 1960:4 2002:2 0.135401 * 
∆4LGDP- 1960:3 2002:2 0.066682 * 
∆∆4LGDP- 1960:4 2002:2 0.500000  
LSTOIKOV 1967:3 2002:2 0.178558  
LCPI 1969:3 2001:3 0.340900  
∆1LCPI 1969:4 2001:3 0.123388 * 
∆4LCPI 1970:3 2002:2 0.110269 * 
∆∆4LCPI 1970:4 2002:2 0.101229 * 
LIPD 1959:3 2002:2 0.244531  
∆1LIPD 1959:4 2002:2 0.315417  
∆4LIPD 1960:3 2002:2 0.317807  
∆∆4LIPD 1960:4 2002:2 0.064296 * 
Source: Critical value at 5 per cent significance = 0.146 under the null of trend stationarity (Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin, 1992, Table 1) 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The authors are Professor of Economics and Director of the Centre of Full Employment and Equity, The 
University of Newcastle; and Professor of Economics and Director, CofFEE-Europe, respectively. 
2 In the last four economic cycles the low point (seasonally adjusted) unemployment rates have been 4.6 per 
cent (June 1976), 5.5 per cent (June 1981), 5.6 per cent (November 1989) and 6.0 percent in September 
2000 (Mitchell and Carlson, 2001).   
3 NAIRU stands for Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment. 
4 The Reserve Bank of Australia is the central bank. 
5 The benchmark requires that output growth must be approximately equal to the sum of labour productivity 
and labour force growth for unemployment to remain unchanged. Following a negative output shock, real 
output growth must exceed this benchmark rate for the economy to return to full employment.   
6 The results derived from recursive least squares are indicative only as the AR(1) models may not be the 
best characterisation of the underlying data generating processes. 
7 These studies include Campbell and Mankiw (1987, 1989), Cochrane (1988). 
8 Layard (1998) underpins his argument with a major assertion that new jobs follow an increase in the 
effective labour supply. In what represents a modern restatement of Say’s Law and the efficacy of the real 
balance effect, he says (1998: 26) “the mechanism is simple enough. If the labour supply increases and the 
number of jobs does not, inflation starts to fall; this makes possible an increase in aggregate demand in the 
economy, which in turn increases employment in line with the increase in the labour supply.” It is a pity 
that OECD economies in general have not witnessed these dynamics over the last 25 years. 
9 Long term unemployment is defined as spells of unemployment in excess of 52 weeks. 
10 Due to the interaction between various labour markets, the regime change in the labour market will likely 
be less strict than indicated by the demarcation ∆LF + qLFt-1 = ∆E. We ignore this complexity in this 
paper. 
11 Mitchell (2001a) tested for NAIRU dynamics in similarly derived Phillips curve models for Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  There was no evidence of a 
constant NAIRU operating in these countries. In each case, there is evidence of a non-vertical long-run 
Phillips curve although for Canada, France, and Italy, the findings are weak. Further, in the case of the 
United Kingdom and the United States, the change of unemployment is statistically significant indicating 
that hysteretic forces are present. 
